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Abstract
We find that prices offered by competing bookmakers within the same quote-driven soccer
(football) betting market provide arbitrage opportunities. However, the management practices
of bookmakers prevent informed bettors exploiting these in practice. We identify two groups of
bookmakers, ‘position-takers’ and ‘book-balancers.’ Position-takers alter their odds
infrequently, while actively restricting informed traders. Book-balancers actively manage
inventory by adjusting odds, and place few restrictions on their customers. We identify 545
arbitrage portfolios, and find that around 50% would require a bet on the favourite at the
position-taking bookmaker. The management practices of position-takers generally prevent
these opportunities being exploited in practice.
JEL classification: (D23), (L22), (L83)
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21. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the impact of new entrants into the European market for soccer betting,
which until recently has been dominated by European (and generally UK) based operators.
Specifically, we evaluate how the recent entry of several large and (predominantly, though not
exclusively) Asian bookmaking organisations has affected the range of odds available to
consumers, with potential consequences for the efficiency of the market. As such, this paper
contributes to a significant empirical interest in, and literature on, the operation of betting
markets.
A principal motivation for this study is the fact that there are clear, material differences between
the recent entrants and the more established operators, both in product portfolios and aspects
of operating behaviour. These differences raise the possibility of profitable arbitrage
opportunities for bettors, with attendant implications for market efficiency.
The paper is structured as follows. This section explains briefly why betting markets in general
constitute a fertile territory for studies of market behaviour and efficiency. This leads into a
discussion of the recent structural changes in the European soccer betting market. Section 2
outlines relevant theoretical material in relation to arbitrage and bookmaker behaviour. Section
3 develops hypotheses, and the data and methods employed to test these are outlined in Section
4. Section 5 presents results and Section 6 offers a discussion and conclusion.
1.1 Betting Markets as an Investigative Medium
A number of characteristics of bookmaker-driven betting markets make them both interesting in
their own right, as well as an ideal setting for field experiments to explore aspects of broader
financial market efficiency (see, for example, Sauer, 1998; Vaughan Williams, 1999, 2005;
Oikonomidis and Johnson, 2011). As explained by Thaler and Ziemba (1988) a key advantage of
betting markets is the fact that the objective values of assets are determined with certainty at
the close of the market, as the outcome of the betting event is revealed. Decisions made in
betting markets (i.e. bets placed) are clearly and individually recorded and this, together with the
3very large number of individual markets, ensures a rich documentary resource for empirical
investigation. Additionally, betting markets resemble other financial markets in terms of the
varying sophistication levels of traders, who risk their own assets on the uncertain outcome of
future events. Betting markets may therefore provide more generalizable results than those from
laboratory experiments, in which subjects may be inexperienced traders and hold limited
motivation (Levitt and List, 2007).
Our focus in this paper is on structural change in the betting markets for European soccer
associated with the entry of large, generally Asian-based bookmakers, such as SBOBet and
Pinnacle, alongside traditional European bookmakers, such as the U.K.-based William Hill and
Ladbrokes. An interesting aspect of this change is that there are distinct and observable
differences in operating practice between the established bookmakers and the new entrants, in
relation to trading restrictions, volatility of the odds menu and the range of event outcomes
offered. These are now explained.
With regard to trading policy, the new entrants adopt a conspicuously more liberal approach to
clients in that they make no attempt to restrict bets from potentially `informed’ or more
sophisticated bettors. Pinnacle, for example, explicitly state:
`Our Winners Welcome policy is very straight-forward. We do not limit, discriminate or
close accounts of successful players, and here is why:
 Our business model is focused solely on maximising volume irrespective of
whether this is generated from profitable players
 We need sharp players to help tighten our odds as we do not take positions
 We have the confidence in our traders to focus on managing odds, not
players’
By contrast, traditional European operators actively manage their client portfolios to deter
trade from these groups. Where an individual’s betting activity generates what these
bookmakers regard as an unprofitable line of business over a sustained period, this frequently
4results either in staking limits being imposed on that individual, delays in settling debts, or at
the limit, termination of the ability to trade. The following actual, but anonymised, example of
an e-mail communication (one of a number of similar examples held by the authors) illustrates
this practice.
`Following a review of your account by our trading department, moving forward you are
no longer going to be able to place bets to the stake size that you have been
accustomed to. Although your account will remain open and active, the bets you are
likely to be able to place will be significantly less than what you have been able place in
the past. ‘
In addition, this practice of turning away or deterring potentially unprofitable business has been
widely reported in the general and specialist media. The Guardian (28 June, 2016) describes one
such instance:
`Bet365, one of the internet’s biggest bookmakers, is facing legal action from a
customer over its failure to transfer a £54,000 balance to her bank account despite
repeated requests over a period of months. While refusing to release the backer’s
winnings on a series of horse racing bets, Bet365 also told her that she would be
restricted to a maximum stake of £1 if she wished to bet with the balance but was
welcome to gamble as much as she wished on gaming products, which have a
guaranteed margin for the operator. The punter, whose identity is known to the
Guardian, opened an account with Bet365 on 16 April and deposited £30,000 with the
firm the following day, when she placed a series of bets on horse racing and lost
£23,000. She received an email from Bet365 the same day, which stated that the size of
the maximum bet she was allowed to place had been increased. The following day she
placed further bets with the remaining £7,000, winning a total of £47,000, which raised
her balance to about £54,000. The same day she was informed via email that in future
her account would be restricted to a maximum stake of £1 on racing bets as the result of
a “trading decision”.’
The UK Horseracing Bettors’ Forum (UKHBF) conducted a survey in April 2016 of betting
account closure, which demonstrated the widespread nature of the practice among UK
bookmakers. On the basis of the survey, it was estimated that around 20,000 accounts had
been closed in the previous six months (The Guardian, 13 June 2016, UKHBF (2016)).
5These sharply distinct approaches to clients are further reflected in differences in the evolution
of betting markets relating to individual events. European operators vary the initial menu of odds
only occasionally. In contrast, the new entrant operators engage in much more frequent odds
adjustments as information is brought, unfettered, to market by a wider clientele.
A comparison between leading representatives of each group of bookmakers (SBOBet and
Ladbrokes), employing the main dataset used in this study (see Section 3, below, for details),
charts changes in odds collected at nine points in time in the 24 hours leading to the kickoff of
2,132 matches. This reveals that the odds of the book-balancing bookmaker SBOBet are different
at point t (compared to its odds at point t-1) on 77% of occasions. However, the odds of the PTB,
Ladbrokes, only differ from the preceding time period on 12.4% of occasions. SBOBet odds
changed, on average, on 5.4 occasions per match in the 24 hours prior to kick off whilst the
equivalent figure for Ladbrokes is 0.8. A t-test confirms that the difference in the frequency of
changes is very unlikely to be random (p-value= 0.000).
The active client management adopted by established European-based operators restricts
turnover, relative to their new entrant counterparts. However, the former can expect to secure
higher margins by avoiding exposure to informed behaviour. These relatively high margins will
also be required to offset risks of holding inventory in the form of unbalanced liabilities across
match outcomes.
We refer to traditional European operators as ‘position-taking bookmakers’ (PTBs), reflecting the
inflexibility of their odds. The dynamic odds of the new entrant bookmakers, by contrast, whilst
minimising the risk of holding outcome-dependant inventory, result in lower margins associated
with the higher processing costs of frequently changing odds. We refer to these bookmakers as
‘book-balancing bookmakers’ (BBBs). The theoretical underpinnings of the distinctions between
PTBs and BBBs are explained more fully in Section 2.2.
A further significant distinction between the groups, in product terms, relates to the prominent
use of the Asian Handicap (AH) product by the BBBs. This effectively eliminates the need for the
bookmaker to set odds against the ‘draw’ outcome by setting a point spread involving a fraction
of a goal, or refunding bets in the case of a draw. Effectively, this simplifies inventory rebalancing
6as the market consists of two, rather than three outcomes, compared with the threefold ‘Home-
Draw-Away’ or 1X2 menu offered by PTBs.
Table 1 offers a summary comparison of differing characteristics of the distinct bookmaker
groups.
Table 1: Summary of distinctions between established and new-entrant bookmaker groups in the European soccer
betting market
Feature of bookmaker
group
Established Group New Entrant Group
Geographic origin/HQ Europe (generally) Asia
Trading medium Betting offices + On-line On-line
Principle of operation Position-taking Book-balancing
Trading volume Relatively low Relatively high
Margins Relatively high Relatively low
Match outcome portfolio Win/Draw/Lose (1X2) Asian Handicap
Frequency of odds changes Low High
Exposure to result-specific
risk
Relatively high Low
Client management High, restrictive Low, non-restrictive
The contrast in operating strategies across the two types of bookmaker operating in parallel
offers a unique opportunity to analyse parallel dealer-driven markets. A clear focus for
investigation is the potential for exploitation of profitable arbitrage opportunities associated with
the heterogeneous pricing behaviour of the two types of bookmaker.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
This section offers some theoretical context for the issues explored in this paper. Two strands
of theory are considered. The first relates to arbitrage as a mechanism of market adjustment
where temporary but consistent opportunities for profitable trading occur. The second relates
to different conceptual approaches to our understanding of bookmaker behaviour. Together
they underpin the classification of bookmakers suggested in the previous section and provide
7the basis for interpretation and understanding of the results generated by the empirical
analysis.
2.1. Arbitrage and Efficiency in Financial and Betting Markets
Central to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) (Fama, 1970) is the idea that rational
arbitrageurs drive temporary deviations in prices towards efficient benchmarks. Prices will
therefore reflect fundamental values, providing that arbitrageurs are willing to trade sufficiently
to impact market values (Friedman, 1953) and in the absence of limitations to arbitrage (see
Gromb and Vayanos, 2010). There is evidence to suggest that theoretical arbitrage opportunities
may be illusory in the face of institutional frictions (McLean and Pontiff, 2016).
Theoretical models of dealer market microstructure emphasise the role of institutional factors
such as order processing (e.g. Roll, 1984), inventory (e.g. Stoll, 1978; Amihud and Mendelson,
1980) and pre-trade transparency on market efficiency (see, for example reviews of market
microstructure by Madhavan, 2000 and Biais, Glosten and Spatt, 2005) as well as more general
factors such as asymmetric information (e.g. Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Easley and O’Hara,
1987).
Sauer (1998) indicates that a betting market is considered efficient if it is not possible to generate
abnormal returns (strong test), or if differential returns are unavailable to the bettor simply by
placing stakes at different odds, such as on favourites (weak test). In general, the main
determinant of betting market efficiency is the degree to which market odds reflect the true
probabilities of event outcomes over a large sample. This is analogous to the degree to which
market prices reflect fundamental values in other financial markets. The possibility of ‘zero’ risk
arbitrage has been explored in the soccer betting market, examining the extent to which
differences in quoted odds across bookmakers are sufficient to guarantee profitable, fully hedged
positions through the construction of a synthetic Dutch Book. Pope and Peel (1989) showed that
arbitrage opportunities were occasionally available across U.K. bookmakers. However, later
research suggested that the degree of coordination between bookmakers has increased (Dixon
and Pope, 2004; Deschamps and Gergaud, 2007; Luckner and Weinhardt, 2008; Deschamps,
2008; Vlastakis, Dotsis and Markellos, 2009; Spann and Skiera, 2009; Franck, Verbeek and Nüesch,
82010). This may have arisen due to the emergence of professional arbitrageurs (Dixon and Pope,
2004).
Recently, Franck et al. (2013) analysed bookmakers’ odds and parallel betting exchange odds for
a sample of 12,782 European soccer matches over a seven-year period, 2004-05 to 2010-11. They
found that cross-bookmaker arbitrage opportunities existed in 0.8% of matches in their sample,
which included only PTBs. However, when considering bookmaker odds in parallel to the betting
exchange Betfair, the proportion of matches offering arbitrage opportunities increased to 19.2%.
These opportunities involved taking a long position at the bookmaker and ‘laying’ the same
position at the betting exchange.1 Profits from the arbitrage portfolios were almost exclusively
against the bookmakers (7% in portfolios against the bookmaker, and close to zero in portfolios
against the betting exchange).
Conclusions regarding the existence of arbitrage opportunities vary with the market under
investigation. Arbitrage opportunities arise more frequently between market structures than
within market structures (Edelman and O’Brian, 2004; Franck, Verbeek, and Nüesch, 2013). To
date, studies analysing arbitrage in betting markets have considered only bookmakers operating
as PTBs. Levitt (2004), for example, notes that PTBs set odds strategically in order to profit from
the biases of uninformed bettors. This study seeks to uncover the extent to which this price
setting mechanism affects market efficiency when BBBs, who do not seek to exploit trader biases,
operate in parallel.
2.2. The Behaviour of Bookmakers
Levitt (2004) argues that betting markets are, in one important respect, organized differently
from other financial markets. As the main providers of liquidity, bookmakers essentially take large
positions against their customers (or against particular event outcomes favoured by customers)
rather than necessarily matching sellers with buyers and simply earning the commission from the
spread (overround). Franck et al. (2013) suggest that bookmakers also, effectively, choose the
bettors against whom they take such positions. They achieve this by monitoring client trades and
1 Long only arbitrage portfolios employing the betting exchange and bookmakers in the creation of a synthetic
Dutch book were also considered in the study by Franck, Verbeek, and Nüesch (2013), but arose in only 5.0% of
matches.
9restricting service to those profiled as potentially skilled. In this context, bookmakers may
occasionally publish inefficient match odds that are likely to attract customers in general, safe in
the knowledge that they can eliminate (by restricting or preventing their bets) those who seek to
place the majority of their bets at these inefficient prices. Any cost to the bookmaker from the
setting of theoretically inefficient odds is therefore potentially lower than the gain from the
increase in the size of the customer base. Newall (2015) notes that in the U.K., PTBs tended to
advertise exotic bets (such as first goalscorer) to further attract uninformed clients.
An alternative view is that the objective of bookmakers is to balance their books, and as a result,
secure profit independent of the event’s outcome (Magee, 1990; Woodland and Woodland 1991,
Hodges, Lin, and Liu, 2013). Such bookmakers will change their odds frequently in order to
account for inventory imbalance. They act as uninformed market makers and essentially set up
an over-the-counter market. Holding ‘zero-book’, these market-making bookmakers act as
though they are infinitely risk-averse (Fingleton and Waldron, 1999) and could plausibly charge
lower transaction commissions, due to the absence of adverse selection costs. Discriminating
against skilled bettors is less of an issue with BBBs, since their model is based on the maximization
of volume rather on successful positions (see Forrest, 2012 for more details of the BBBs model).
In soccer betting, despite the coexistence of PTBs and BBBs, the literature has focused almost
exclusively on analysing odds offered by the former. This is surprising, as the economic
significance of the latter is probably greater, at least in terms of volumes wagered (Forrest, 2012).
Given the significant differences in the structure of the bookmakers’ models, potential arbitrage
between the two types of bookmakers may be regarded as inter-market opportunities.
Franck et al.’s (2013) proposition that bookmakers set odds to maximise long-term profit from
an increased customer base, rather than to maximise profit per game, is novel in linking odds-
setting with the bookmaker’s option to withhold service from those clients it believes to be
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informed.2 This presents a distinction between betting and other financial markets, which should
be acknowledged when the efficiency of bookmakers’ odds is investigated.3
Whilst the current study represents a development of Franck et al.’s (2013) line of enquiry, it
differs from the earlier approach in a number of respects that are important in terms of the
robustness of the results generated. The first difference relates to the fact that arbitrage requires
that different prices must be simultaneously available. The bookmakers’ odds utilized by Franck
et al. (2013) bear no time-stamp; rather, they are assumed to be constant and available for a
given time interval, which is often not the case, certainly for BBBs and even on occasion for PTBs.
Second, Franck et al.’s focus on the matched offers between a betting exchange and bookmakers
were observed up to 2 days prior to kick-off, when the amount of money that can be staked in a
betting exchange is very low, suggesting that even if arbitrage opportunities exist, they may not
be economically meaningful. Third, Franck et al. (2013) only examined one particular exchange,
Betfair, which levies a commission on winning customers (referred to as ‘premium charges’).4
Fourth, even though the volume that one can stake in a betting exchange increases as kick-off
approaches, it is shown below that there is significant variation in the size of the stakes that can
be placed across games. This compromises the homogeneity of the sample, as several apparent
arbitrage opportunities are economically insignificant, because only small wagers are possible.
Consequently, it is important to test the proposition suggested by Franck et al. (2013), in the
particular context of arbitrage between exchange and bookmaker markets, employing a dataset
that avoids the above limitations, in order properly to test empirically the theoretical proposition.
Certainly, the widening of the set, and the greater diversity, of bookmaker activity under
consideration here might reasonably be expected to generate a significant increase in arbitrage
opportunities. This observation applies equally when comparing our results with those of
2 An example of the restriction notices from Bet365 and William Hill, among others can be found at
http://www.the-secret-system.com/bookmakers-shutdown-messages.html. PTBs refer to the use of restrictions as
a ‘commercial decision’.
3 Proprietary dark pools (equity trading services that do not publicly display orders) offered by firms such as Getco
and Knight Capital trade on principal accounts, and may exclude sophisticated, or informed counterparties. Because
they are relatively opaque in their execution services, and do not guarantee execution (especially for informed
investors), they present an interesting analogue to position-taking bookmakers. See Zhu (2014) for further details
on proprietary dark pools.
4 Betfair may withhold up to 60% out of winning bettors profits (see the website http://www.betfair.
com/www/GBR/en/aboutUs/Betfair.Charges/)
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Vlastakis et al. (2009) who investigated arbitrage opportunities among a population of five PTBs
and one BBB. Their results revealed sixty three arbitrage opportunities across the aggregate
group of six, which reduced to just ten within the group of five PTBs, though they caution that
these results may underestimate actual arbitrage opportunities as their analysis considered only
closing odds, which would deny identification of opportunities associated with earlier available
price menus.
In addition, we argue that any investigation of the EMH using odds provided by PTBs may lead to
biased conclusions. Specifically, as suggested by Franck et al. (2013), such market operators may
intentionally set “inefficient” prices as a marketing strategy to attract customers. Such
complications in the assessment of market efficiency should not exist when employing the odds
of BBBs, since their prices should not be influenced by client identity. Consequently, odds in this
market constitute more appropriate data for testing the EMH.
3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The preceding discussion suggests that arbitrage opportunities between bookmakers from the
same group (i.e. PTBs or BBBs) will be rare, but prices of PTBs and BBBs, operating in the same
market, may be sufficiently disparate to incentivise arbitrage. However, because PTBs effectively
prevent skilled traders from exploiting these opportunities, such arbitrage will be illusory. In
exploring the validity of this proposition, we test the following five related hypotheses:
H1: There exist instances where price dispersion in the betting market is adequate to generate
apparently risk-free opportunities for bettors to profit by simultaneously betting with different
bookmakers on alternative outcomes related to the same event.
Levitt (2004) studied trading volume from a major PTB, showing that bettors tend
disproportionately to prefer staking on favourites, rather than longshots, relative to their odds
implied probabilities. Profit-maximizing bookmakers hence face net exposure to favourites.
Relatedly, Forrest and Simmons (2008) and Franck et al. (2011) show that PTBs offer better prices
for bets on popular teams, in order to sustain competition and to build/maintain their customer
base. Consequently, we expect that in most cases where apparent arbitrage opportunities exist,
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the PTB will post the best offer for the favourite and the BBB will post the best offer for the
longshot, suggesting the following hypothesis:
H2: Apparent arbitrage opportunities most commonly arise between BBBs and PTBs, by PTBs
offering the longer odds for favourites and BBBs offering the longer odds for longshots.
Based on Franck et al.’s (2013) finding that arbitrage profits between the betting exchange and
PTBs were typically earned at the expense of bookmakers, we expect that in exploring trade
across PTBs and BBBs, apparent arbitrage profits are also earned at the expense of the PTBs, not
the BBBs (given PTBs’ failure to adjust odds quickly enough to incorporate price-informative
trends signalled by informed money traded with BBBs). We, therefore, test the following
hypothesis:
H3a: When an apparent arbitrage opportunity arises, a greater proportion of the risk-free profit
will be earned in trade with the PTB, rather than the BBB.
We also expect that the odds offered by BBBs (cf. PTBs) are better calibrated, i.e. we expect that
BBBs’ odds-implied probabilities are more reflective of match outcomes. If PTBs were solely
interested in efficient estimation of event probabilities, they could simply adjust their odds to
those of the BBBs. If we show that the PTBs do not adjust their odds in this way then this is
supportive of Franck et al.’s (2013) proposition that promotional considerations form part of their
odds-setting strategy. We, therefore, test the following hypothesis:
H3b: BBBs’ odds constitute more accurate predictors (cf. those of PTBs) of event outcomes.
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
4.1. Bookmaker Classification and Data
We employ data from major bookmakers representing both BBBs and PTBs. We classify
Ladbrokes, William Hill, Bet365, and Stan James as PTBs, and IBCBet, Pinnacle, SBOBet and 188Bet
as BBBs, based on extensive consultation with bettors and interpretation of the information
presented below.
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PTBs: Ladbrokes and William Hill operate retail businesses with thousands of betting shops,
mainly in the U.K. They also operate online, and their combined aggregate gross revenue exceeds
£1 Billion. 5 Bet365 is a major UK-based betting company founded in 2001, which achieved
turnover of £8.5 Billion and gross profit of £422 Million in 2011.6 Stan James is a private company
operating mainly online, while owning 65 betting shops in the U.K. 7 One of the defining
characteristics of PTBs is their physical-world presence, which is important to each of these
bookmakers. Annual reports for these bookmakers note that their profitability depends on match
results.8
BBBs: SBOBet, IBCbet, 188Bet are leading BBB operators, handling trading volumes far in excess
of more traditional European bookmakers (Forrest, 2012). Pinnacle is a major online operator,
trading billions of dollars, which describes itself explicitly on its website 9 as attempting to
maximize trading volume while minimizing exposure, using information arising from informed
traders as a tool to set efficient odds. In particular, Pinnacle emphasizes that it is friendly to
arbitrageurs, as the expected value of a trade to the operator should not depend on the motives
of the counterparty placing the stake. The model described by Pinnacle also fits the operations
of the three bookmakers listed above and is aligned with the model of BBBs. Importantly, each
of these operators lacks physical-world presence (betting shops) and has an empirically
demonstrable tendency to change odds frequently.
In order to ensure that potential arbitrage trades could have realistically been executed, we
designed a data collection program to obtain odds information systematically from bookmakers’
websites. This involved surveying different bookmakers’ websites simultaneously, so differential
odds from our panel of bookmakers reflect genuine, real-time price dispersion, rather than
information-driven outcomes. The program included a time-out coefficient to ensure a maximum
discrepancy in odds collection of 30 seconds. In other words, where odds were/were not
5 See William Hill (2013) “Preliminary Results 2012” and Ladbrokes (2013) “Preliminary Results for the Year
Ended December 2012.”
6 Source: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmcumeds/writev/ 1554/ga104.htm.
7 Source: http://howtobet.net/sportsbook-review/stan-james.
8 For example, Ladbrokes’ 2013 annual report (p.23) notes “Ladbrokes may experience significant losses as a result
of a failure to determine accurately the odds in relation to any particular event.”
9 See, inter alia, http://www.pinnaclesports.com/about-us.aspx, http://www.pinnaclesports. com/betting-
promotions/arbitrage-friendly, and http://www.pinnaclesports.com/ betting-promotions/winners-welcome.
14
forthcoming from the bookmaker within 30 seconds, it was assumed that these odds were/were
not available as a basis for arbitrage.10 All odds were collected in a period within 2 hours of kick-
off, when the staking levels reach their peak. We focused on the major European soccer leagues
in order to ensure that the findings of the study carry economic significance, as the volumes
traded in leagues of lower status are significantly smaller. We collected data, for the whole of the
2012-13 season for the 6 major leagues; the English Premier League, the German Bundesliga, the
Italian Serie A, the Spanish La Liga, the French Ligue 1, and the Dutch Eredivisie. Overall, this
resulted in a sample of 2,132 games, which we refer to as the `main sample’.
For each match, odds were collected for several bookmaker products: the AH, and home win,
draw, and away win (also known as 1X2) markets. In AH betting, one of the teams (usually the
favourite) is given a goal-deficit (handicap) to overcome, the size of which is indicated by a
negative number. A bet is successful if the handicapped team wins the match by a greater margin
than the handicap. A bet on the opposing team is successful providing it does not lose by a margin
greater than the handicap. Fractional AHs include the draw outcome. For example, a team with
a handicap of −0.5, starts with a half goal deficit, meaning that the team must win outright (that
is, not draw) for the bet to pay off11. A team which is handicapped +0.5 starts with a half goal
advantage, so a bet on that team wins even if the outcome is a draw. A bet on a team with a 0
handicap is refunded in the event of the draw, whereas a bet on team with a -0.25 (+0.25)
10 The cost of this was that several bookmakers occasionally failed to respond within the maximum allowed period.
In these cases, we repeated the full request (i.e. for all bookmakers) three times in order to obtain a complete
sample. In some cases, due to heavy load on bookmakers’ websites, some would remain unresponsive. In those
cases, the odds of those who failed to respond were not considered, which may lead to a slight underestimation of
the frequency of arbitrage opportunities overall. The timeout could be increased in future studies, however, this
would risk the integrity of the results overall, as a higher time interval would increase the chance of odds of the
quickest responding bookmaker changing until the response of the slowest bookmaker came back. The collection of
data from bookmakers remains a difficult practice at best.
11 To illustrate, assume that the following Asian Handicap odds are offered on a match between Chelsea and
Arsenal::
Chelsea (-0.5 goals) 1.83.
Arsenal 1.80
This means that a successful bet requires Chelsea to overcome the (-0.5 goals) handicap, i.e. they must win by any
single goal (or above) margin. Any draw would (with the handicap) mean a win for Arsenal (e.g. a 1-1 draw would,
in effect, become Chelsea 0.5 - Arsenal 1. This format reduces the match outcome to two alternatives.
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handicap is considered as a half-bet on 0 handicap and a half-bet on -0.5 (+0.5).12 The AHs that
are of interest here are those in the interval of -0.5 to +0.5, because none of the bets in this range
is dependent on the number of goals scored. Hence, an arbitrage portfolio can potentially be
formed by betting in the home win, draw, and away win (1X2) markets.
Our supplementary set of data (we refer to this as the ‘extended set’) contains historical odds
from six bookmakers (Ladbrokes, William Hill, Bet365, SBOBet, 188Bet, and Pinnacle) for each of
the six leagues in our sample; a total of 6,396 matches over the three seasons from 2010-11 to
2012-13. These data were obtained in a similar fashion to our main data, and were used to
explore the relative incidence of favourite-longshot bias and the degree of calibration between
the odds-implied probabilities of match outcomes and actual match outcomes. We obtained
home win, draw, and away win odds for each match, at a time point within two hours of match
kick-off. We could not use this entire sample (excluding 2012-13 data) to test the economic
efficiency of arbitrage portfolios, as odds were not collected to ensure simultaneous execution
of trades. However, the longer data period allows greater power in statistical tests of efficiency.
4.2. Methodology
4.2.1. Estimating the Frequency of Arbitrage Opportunities
In order to test H1, we formulate a linear optimization problem. This is specifically designed to
provide a comprehensive identification of the existence of arbitrage opportunities between
bookmaker types. Particular and advantageous features of this method are that we survey
arbitrage opportunities throughout the duration of each market, we can assure, reliably, the
temporal co-existence of cross-operator odds differentials which define the opportunities, and
we are able to identify the optimal distribution of stakes across different products in order to
maximize the return. Arbitrage opportunities are deemed to exist where such a return is
positive and invariant across all match outcomes. If there is insufficient dispersion in the odds
12 We present a detailed example of the returns to each bet in the next section.
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across the market to generate an arbitrage opportunity, there will be no feasible solution.
Assuming sufficient dispersion, there will be a range of solutions that offer certain positive
returns and the linear program will suggest the combination that offers the highest profit.
We outline below how this problem is formulated and examined for a single game. This process
is repeated for all 2,132 games in the main sample.
Let ௝ܺ,௞ denote the vector of gross odds offered by bookmaker ,݇ where for each game there are1 ≤ ݆≤ 13 products offered by the bookmaker (i.e. ‘home win’, ‘home win with a −0.5
handicap,’ ‘away win with a +0.5 handicap,’ etc.). The gross return to each of the 13 bookmakers’
products is presented in Table 2, with products 1, 7, and 8 indicating odds from the 1X2 market,
and the rest (with suffix AH) obtained from the AH market. The odds shown in the Table 2 can be
multiplied by stake size S (a scalar) to determine non-unit payouts.
We define the vector ܺ௠ ௔௫ element-wise as ௝ܺ,௠ ௔௫ = max
௞
௝ܺ,௞. In cases where bookmakers are
tied for the highest odds, we retain all possible combinations of maximum prices. For example, if
both Ladbrokes and William Hill were offering gross odds of 1.50 on a home win ( ݆= 1) for a
particular match, and this price was higher than all the other bookmakers’ prices for ݆= 1, we
would retain two ܺ௠ ௔௫ vectors, in order to avoid losing information for H1 and H2.
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Table 2: Gross return to a $1 stake for a single bookmaker on each potential match outcome for different types of
bet, with odds vector ( ଵܺ, . . . , ଵܺଷ)′ indicating the gross payoff for each corresponding market. The suffix AH
indicates that the product is from the Asian Handicap market.
Outcome Bookmaker Return if Return if Return if
( )݆ Product Home Win Draw Away Win
1 Home ଵܺ 0 0
2 Home (−0.5) AH ܺଶ 0 0
3 Home (−0.25) AH ܺଷ 0.5 0
4 Home (0) AH ܺସ 1 0
5 Home (+0.25) AH ܺହ 1 + 0.5(ܺହ − 1) 0
6 Home (+0.5) AH ܺ଺ ܺ଺ 0
7 Draw 0 ܺ଻ 0
8 Away 0 0 ଼ܺ
9 Away (−0.5) AH 0 0 ܺଽ
10 Away (−0.25) AH 0 0.5 ଵܺ଴
11 Away (0) AH 0 1 ଵܺଵ
12 Away (+0.25) AH 0 1 + 0.5(ܺଵଶ − 1) ଵܺଶ
13 Away (+0.5) AH 0 ܺଵଷ ଵܺଷ
Second, we aim to find the set of bets that a bettor would place to best exploit potential arbitrage
opportunities. Let ௝ܵbe the bettor’s allocated stake for each bet type .݆ The profit function ܼ={ ௛ܼ௢௠ ௘௪௜௡, ௗܼ௥௔௪ , ௔ܼ௪௔௬௪௜௡} for each possible match outcome can be defined from the following
set of equations:
௛ܼ௢௠ ௘௪௜௡ = ෍ ௝ܵ ௝ܺ,௠ ௔௫ − ෍ ௝ܵଵଷ
௝ୀଵ
଺
௝ୀଵ
(1)
ௗܼ௥௔௪ = ଻ܵܺ଻,௠ ௔௫ + 0.5( ଷܵ + ଵܵ଴) + ( ସܵ + ଵܵଵ)+ 0.5൫ܵ ହ + ଵܵଶ + ହܵܺହ,௠ ௔௫ + ଵܵଶ ଵܺଶ,௠ ௔௫ ൯− ෍ ௝ܵଵଷ
௝ୀଵ
(2)
௔ܼ௪௔௬௪௜௡ = ෍ ௝ܵ ௝ܺ,௠ ௔௫− ෍ ௝ܵଵଷ
௝ୀଵ
ଵଷ
௝ୀ଼
(3)
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Identifying the best possible arbitrage opportunity requires identifying the distribution of stakes
ܵ that maximizes the payoff for any of the three match outcomes, subject to a set of constraints.
Hence, the optimization identifies the distribution of stakes ܵ that maximizes the payoff for any
of the three match outcomes. The optimization routine can be written as
Find optimal strategy ܵ∗ by varying ܵ such that ௛ܼ௢௠ ௘௪௜௡ is maximized (4)
Subject to constraints
௛ܼ௢௠ ௘௪௜௡ = ௗܼ௥௔௪ (5)
௛ܼ௢௠ ௘௪௜௡ = ௔ܼ௪௔௬௪௜௡ (6)
௛ܼ௢௠ ௘௪௜௡ > 0 (7)
෍ ௝ܵ
ଵଷ
௝ୀଵ
= 1 (8)
௝ܵ≥ 0 ∀݆ (9)
Due to the linear nature of the problem, the simplex algorithm can be used to maximize the
objective function (Dantzig, 1951). Constraints (5) and (6) ensure that the selected combination
of stakes leads to the same return independently of the outcome. Constraint (7) implies that for
the solution to be acceptable, the net return should be positive. Constraint (8) requires that the
sum of stakes should equal 1, so that each ௝ܵwill represent the fraction of the available capital
that should be staked on each bet type. Finally, constraint (9) requires that all stakes are positive.
The optimization will fail to find a feasible solution in the event that arbitrage is not possible for
the given set of bet types on a given game. If there is more than one feasible solution per game,
we would select the bet with the highest return per outcome. In order to test H1 we run this
maximization for each match in the sample.
4.2.2. Identifying Favourites and Longshots by Bookmaker in the Arbitrage Portfolio
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We now explore the methodology employed to test H2, that is, whether arbitrage opportunities
are more likely to occur between PTBs and BBBs (rather than between PTBs, or between BBBs)
and whether the arbitrage portfolio is more likely to involve bets on the favourite against the
PTB.
Matches where an arbitrage opportunity was identified were isolated. We then compared the
frequency of instances in which the PTB offers the highest odds for the ‘favourite’. We then define
indicator variables ܦ௙ and ܦ௟for each match a݅s ܦ௙௜ = 1 if the PTB offers the highest odds for
the favourite on match ,݅ and 0 otherwise, and ܦ௟௜ = 1 if the PTB offers the highest odds on the
longshot for match ,݅ and 0 otherwise. Over the sample of ݊ games in which an arbitrage
opportunity arises, we calculate the proportion of cases where the best offer for the favourite
was provided by PTB.
For H2 to be accepted, this proportion should be significantly higher than 1/2.
4.2.3. The Source of Returns by Bookmaker in the Arbitrage Portfolios
Testing H3a involves exploring whether the bet responsible for the positive returns to the
arbitrage portfolio will be placed with the PTB on the favourite, with the longshot being bet with
negative or zero expectation at the BBB. We conduct a betting simulation, where a unit stake ($1)
is placed on each bet that is selected from the linear program across the total sample of matches.
For each type of bookmaker, we calculate for each match ݅and potential stake at offer ݆the
bettor’s profit ௜ܼ௝, as
௜ܼ௝ = ෍ ௜ܵ௝ܺ௜௝+ ௜ܵ଻ܺ௜଻ + 0.5( ௜ܵଷ + ௜ܵଵ଴) + ( ௜ܵସ + ௜ܵଵଵ)଺
௝ୀଵ + 0.5( ௜ܵହ + ௜ܵଵଶ + ௜ܵହܺ௜ହ + ௜ܵଵଶܺ௜ଵଶ)+ ( ௜ܵ଺ + ௜ܵଵଷܺ௜ଵଷ) + ෍ ௜ܵ௝ܺ௜௝ଵଷ
௝ୀ଼
− ෍ ௝ܵ
ଵଷ
௝ୀଵ
(10)
where ௜ܵ௝ is the amount staked on product i݆n match .݅ In the unit-stake simulation, ௜ܵ௝ = 1 if
there is a bet on product i݆n match ,݅ and zero otherwise. As a result, the average profit that the
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bettor achieves against each type of bookmaker, across the sample of ݊bets can be calculated
as:
ߤ= 1݊෍ ෍ ௜ܼ௝ଵଷ
௝ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
(11)
H3a will not be rejected if ߤ is higher for the group of PTBs than for the group of BBBs. It could
be argued that a consequence of placing a unit stake across each bet is high variance, since
average profit is highly influenced by the outcome of bets on longshots. We ensure that these
latter bets do not lead to biased conclusions regarding the expected profit against each
bookmaker by replicating the simulation, where each stake ௜ܵ௝ is determined by a staking
strategy, the Kelly Criterion (Kelly, 1956), which involves assigning stakes which are inversely
proportional to odds, thereby assuring that for each type of bookmaker, all bets generate equal
expected profit.
௜ܵ௝ = 1ܺ௜௝− 1 (12)
As a result, the average realized profit against each bookmaker across the sample of ݊bets is
ߤ= ∑ ∑ ௜ܼ௝ ௜ܵ௝ଵଷ௝ୀଵ௡௜ୀଵ
∑ ∑ ௜ܵ௝
ଵଷ
௝ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
(13)
We recalculate the means for each of the two types of bookmaker and compare them, in order
to confirm that the conclusions drawn from the unit-stake simulations are not biased by
abnormally positive or negative results on high-odds bets.
4.2.4. The Predictive Power of BBB vs PTB Odds-Implied Probabilities
In order to test whether predictions based on BBBs’ odds are more efficient (H3b) and unbiased
(H3c) predictors of event outcomes than predictions based on PTBs’ odds, we compare the
forecasting accuracy and the favourite longshot bias (FLB) observed in predictions based on the
odds of the two different types of bookmakers. For each group, we employ a conditional logistic
regression (with the probability of outcome ݋derived from the odds as the sole independent
variable), where the outcome of each match is the dependent variable (i.e. home win, draw, or
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away win). The outcome takes value 1 for the event that occurred and 0 for the events that did
not occur. Hence, the probability that outcome ݋ in match ݅occurs, is given by:
ܲ( ௜ܻ௢ = 1) = ݁௓೔೚∑ ௓݁೔೚ଷ௢ୀଵ (14)
where ௜ܼ௢ is a function of the probability ݌௜௢
௦ (as ݌௜௢
௦ is the probability of the event outcome
implied by the odds for each outcome ݋ of match ,݅ where the superscript ݏ implies the
subjective probability based on the bookmaker’s and bettor’s combined assessment of the
chance of this outcome), such that
௜ܼ௢ = ܾ× ln(݌௜௢௦ ) (15)
where b is a coefficient derived from a conditional logit regression estimated on the basis of past
results, and ݌௜௢
௦ can be calculated from the odds ܺ௜௢ of outcome ݋ in match a݅s
݌௜௢
௦ = 1
ܺ௜௢(1 + ߩ௜) (16)
and ߩ௜ is the bookmaker’s over-round. This can be calculated from the odds offered for all
outcomes ݋of match a݅s
ߩ௜ = ෍ 1ܺ
௜௢
− 1ଷ
௜ୀଵ
(17)
Hence, (14) can be written as
ܲ( ௜ܻ௢ = 1) = ݁௕×୪୬൫௣೔೚ೞ ൯
∑ ݁௕×୪୬൫௣೔೚ೞ ൯ଷ௢ୀଵ = (݌௜௢௦ )௕∑ (݌௜௢௦ )௕ଷ௢ୀଵ (18)
Positive FLB indicates that the bookmaker odds underestimate the probability of the most likely
event occurring. Therefore, if a bookmaker exhibits this bias, the actual winning probability of
favourites, as implied by their observed frequency of success, will be higher than that expected
by the odds; whereas for the longshots it will be lower. Thus, denoting as ݌௜௢
௩ the ‘true’ or
objective probability (the ‘ݒ’ denoting ‘verifiable’ or objective probability) of outcome ݋ in match
,݅ we can infer the following.
݌௜௙
௦ > ݌௜௟௦ ⟹ ݌௜௙௩݌௜௙௦ > ݌௜௟௩݌௜௟௦ (19)
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where ݂denotes favourite and d݈enotes longshot.
Subject to (18),
݌௜௙
௩
݌௜௙
௦ > ݌௜௟௩݌௜௟௦ ⟹ ൫݌௜௙௦ ൯௕∑ ൫݌௜௙௦ ൯௕ଷ௢ୀଵ > (݌௜௟௦)௕∑ (݌௜௟௦)௕ଷ௢ୀଵ ⟹ ൫݌௜௙௦ ൯௕ିଵ > (݌௜௟௦)௕ିଵ (20)
where if ݌௜௙
௦ > ݌௜௟௦, (14) is only valid where ܾ> 1. Consequently, the odds of a given bookmaker
underestimate favourites on average, only if ܾ in (20) is significantly greater than 1 and higher
values of b indicate higher degree of bias. Maximum likelihood is employed to estimate ܾ for each
bookmaker. To assess the accuracy of each bookmaker’s predictions, we compared the values of
McFadden’s (1974) pseudo-R2 statistic that each bookmaker’s odds implied probabilities achieve
in the conditional logit model (a higher pseudo-R2 implies a superior model fit and hence a greater
degree of efficiency).
5. RESULTS
5.1. Arbitrage Opportunities across Bookmakers
Table 3 reports the average closing odds correlation in our main sample that demonstrates that,
on average, bookmakers’ offers are reasonably well-aligned. The highest level of correlation is
observed amongst BBBs. Whilst these bookmakers move their odds more frequently (adjusting
for individual high stakes), such adjustments seem to happen in parallel across the set of BBBs.
Among PTBs, Bet365 seems to be the bookmaker most aligned with the BBBs (possibly because
it is the only bookmaker in the group for which online betting is its main focus), whereas
Ladbrokes and especially Stan James show the least correlation with the BBBs.
The optimization process presented in (4) to (9) reveals the existence of 545 arbitrage
opportunities across the 2,132 (that is, in 25.6% of) matches in our sample. Notably, this figure is
significantly higher than the results of earlier studies (Franck et al. (2013), Vlastakis et al. (2009))
a fact which may be explained by a combination of the methodology employed to identify
opportunities in this paper and the range of bookmakers under scrutiny. The method employed
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here, as described above, offers a comprehensive and reliable identification of opportunities by
embodying time precision regarding the co-availability of odds and by ensuring identification of
opportunities throughout the duration of the market, rather than, as with both Franck et al.
(2013) and Vlastakis et al. (2009), considering opportunities only at a single point in time. In terms
of the range of bookmakers identified, this study examines opportunities across six operators,
three BBBs and three PTBs. This gives a degree of diversity which is not matched by earlier
studies, with Franck et al. (2013) focusing on activity across a group of PTBs and a single betting
exchange, and Vlastakis et al. (2009) considering a different group of PTBs and a single BBB. In
this context, for reasons of both methodology and the nature of samples under scrutiny, the
differences are arguably unsurprising.
The distribution of arbitrage opportunities across the different leagues is shown in Table 3 and
the frequency with which each bookmaker’s odds feature in the optimized portfolio are shown
in Table 4. The arbitrage opportunities are well dispersed across the leagues, although the
relatively low frequency in Holland returns a ߯ଶ(5) test of independence with a p-value of 0.048.
This is probably because Holland is the least popular of the six major leagues, and there is less
competition among bookmakers to supply competitive odds (and less benefit from promoting
inefficient odds). Consequently, transaction costs are higher, reducing the potential for arbitrage
opportunities.
Table 3: Average closing odds correlation between bookmakers in main sample. Panel A reports the correlation
matrix of closing odds across all bookmakers, Panel B reports the average correlation between and within groups
of book-balancing and position-taking bookmakers.
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Panel A: Correlation in Odds Between Bookmakers
Position Takers Book Balancers
Bookmaker
Ladbrokes
William
Hill
Bet 365 Stan James SBOBet 188Bet Pinnacle
Position
Takers
Ladbrokes 1.0000
William Hill 0.9927 1.0000
Bet 365 0.9907 0.9950 1.0000
Stan James 0.9928 0.9917 0.9891 1.0000
Book
Balancers
SBOBet 0.9884 0.9925 0.9947 0.9849 1.0000
188Bet 0.9890 0.9942 0.9970 0.9867 0.9971 1.0000
Pinnacle 0.9890 0.9944 0.9971 0.9868 0.9971 0.9987 1.0000
Panel B: Average Correlation Within and Across Groups
Group 1 Group 2 Average
Position Takers Book Balancers 0.9913
Position Takers Position Takers 0.9920
Book Balancers Book Balancers 0.9976
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Table 4: Number of Matches with Arbitrage Opportunities by League.
League
Number of Matches with
Arbitrage Opportunity
Proportion of
Arbitrage
Opportunities
Across all
Leagues
Proportion of
Arbitrage
Opportunities
per Match
Matches in
Sample
England 90 16.51%1 23.68%2 380
Spain 109 20.00% 28.68% 380
Italy 101 18.53% 26.58% 380
Germany 94 17.25% 30.72% 306
France 94 17.25% 24.74% 380
Holland 57 10.46% 18.63% 306
TOTAL 545 100.00% 25.56% 2,132
1 90/545 2 90/380
The linear program (4) to (9) can result in the odds of a diverse number of bookmakers featuring
in each potential arbitrage opportunity (ranging from 2 to 6 in our sample), in order to achieve
the maximum risk-free profit. In cases where multiple bookmakers post equal maximum odds for
the same market, we attribute each of the bookmakers as having supplied the arbitrage
opportunity. It is clear from Table 5 that some bookmakers are more likely to be involved in the
generation of a theoretically risk-free portfolio.13 The frequency of the appearance of PTBs is
likely to be related to each operator’s policy on promotional odds. A test of independence rejects
that bookmakers appear with equal frequency in arbitrage portfolios (߯ଶ(6) = 615.4, p-value =
0.000).
13 Removing Stan James from the sample causes the instances of potential arbitrage opportunities to drop to 287,
which is indicative of the influence of a bookmaker which applies a policy of offering outlying odds, on the creation
of arbitrage instances.
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Table 5: Number of times a bookmaker’s odds feature in a potential arbitrage portfolio selected by the
optimization programme for the main sample. For each bookmaker we report the relative frequency with which
their odds appeared in the ௠ܺ ௔௫ vector, and featured in the optimal potential arbitrage portfolio identified for a
single game.
Group Bookmaker
Times odds featured in
arbitrage portfolio
Relative
Frequency
Position- Takers
Ladbrokes 237 13.27%
William Hill 59 3.30%
Bet 365 65 3.64%
Stan James 452 25.31%
Book-Balancers
SBOBet 248 13.89%
188Bet 262 14.67%
Pinnacle 463 25.92%
TOTAL 1786 100%
Consistent with the behaviour suggested by the inter-bookmaker correlation statistics, Bet365
and William Hill appear more aligned in their pricing strategy with the BBBs, and hence their odds
appear less frequently in arbitrage portfolios. All BBBs appear as part of an arbitrage portfolio,
with Stan James or Ladbrokes often being on the opposite side. Amongst the BBBs, Pinnacle is
selected most frequently by the optimization program to be part of an arbitrage portfolio. This is
probably because this is the only BBB which exhibits the same low over-round on 1X2 markets as
on the AH products.14 As a result, Pinnacle often offers the highest odds on a draw, which is
frequently a useful bet in terms of equalizing payoffs across all outcomes.15
If a bettor could have maintained access to all 7 bookmakers, without suffering restrictions to her
stake, the fully hedged strategy would have returned an impressive 7.56 times the initial bankroll
14 BBBs maintain an over-round of about 2% in AH markets, but their over-round is nearer 5% − 6% for the 1 × 2
market. On the other hand, Pinnacle’s over-round is about 2% in the 1 × 2 market.
15 Mainly when a positive handicap (i.e. either +0.25 or +0.5) is not selected, the optimization indicates a stake
should be placed on the draw so that there is no negative exposure on the draw outcome.
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across the season (assuming no reinvestment). This corresponds to an average risk-free profit of
1.38% per match. Taken together, the results show that sufficient price dispersion exists in the
market for bettors to create a seemingly risk-free portfolio of bets that would guarantee profits
in 25% of games, assuming they could successfully implement this strategy. These results serve
to support Hypothesis 1, namely, there exist instances where the price dispersion is adequate to
generate theoretically risk-free opportunities for bettors to profit by simultaneously betting with
different bookmakers on alternative outcomes related to the same event.
5.2. Arbitrage Opportunities by Type of Bookmaker
We determine for each apparent arbitrage opportunity the source of odds that make up the
arbitrage portfolio of bets (i.e. from BBBs or PTBs). In particular, we look at the instances where
the odds offered by BBBs or PTBs on the favourite or the longshot feature in the arbitrage
opportunities. These results are displayed in Table 6. In 84% of arbitrage opportunities, one or
more PTBs offered the highest odds on the favourite while one or more BBBs offered the highest
odds on the longshot. Based on this frequency of arbitrage opportunities being created by
bookmakers of different types (BBBs and PTBs), the chance that this phenomenon is random is
very low (Z-statistic = 16.12, p-value=0.000). This finding supports Hypothesis 2, namely, that
most apparent arbitrage opportunities involve bets placed with different types of bookmakers.
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Table 6: Constituent bets in arbitrage portfolios by type of bookmaker and odds. The first (second) column shows
the type of bookmaker for which the optimal arbitrage portfolios contain bets on favourites (longshots). The
favourite is identified as the team with the lower odds on the 1X2 betting market, bets on products 1-6 in Table 2
are considered ‘favourite’ bets if the home team has lower odds; bets on products 8-13 in Table 2 are considered
‘favourite’ bets if the away team has lower odds. All other bets (excluding draw bets) are considered ‘longshot’ bets.
The number and proportion for which arbitrage portfolios are constructed, using bets from each type of bookmaker,
are presented in column 3. Columns 4 and 5 report similar results to column 3, with the strength of the favourite
increasing to $2.00 and $1.70 per dollar bet. Column 6 repeats the results from column 3 with the exclusion of the
outlying position-taking bookmaker Stan James.
Favourite Longshot Num. matches Num. matches Num. matches Num. matches
(full sample) (Fav < 2.00) (Fav < 1.70) (w/o Stan James)
Best Offer by: Best Offer by: prop Prop1 Prop2 Prop
Position Position 41 27 6 18
Taker Taker 0.075 0.071 0.073 0.061
Position Book 277 183 57 152
Taker Balancer 0.508 0.480 0.695 0.514
Book Position 181 142 14 78
Balancer Taker 0.332 0.373 0.171 0.264
Book Book 46 29 5 48
Balancer Balancer 0.084 0.076 0.061 0.162
Total 545 381 82 296
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1, 2 In order to illustrate how the arbitrage opportunities vary as the strength of the favourite increases, we select
categories where there are sufficient matches to give meaningful proportions of arbitrage opportunities and where
the favourites’ odds are low. To match these criteria we select favourites’ odds of < 2 and < 1.7 and show, in
columns 4 and 5, respectively, the proportions of arbitrage opportunities which arise with favourites with odds less
than 2 and less than 1.7
The results displayed in Table 6 also show that PTBs are significantly more likely to offer an
improvement over market odds for the favourite rather than for the longshot. On 58% of
occasions, a PTB offered the best odds for the favourite, compared with 44.4% offering the best
odds on the longshot. Such a difference is unlikely to be random (Z-statistic = 5.86, p-value =
0.000). This tendency is more pronounced on stronger favourites. Since PTBs attract higher
volumes on favourites than on longshots (Levitt, 2004), our finding is consistent with the view
that PTBs16 are inclined to inflate odds for popular bets in order to attract customers. As a result,
arbitrage opportunities most commonly emerge where a PTB offers the best odds for the
16 Such studies do not distinguish between diverse types of operators, but they assume a type of bookmaker
consistent with our PTB definition.
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favourite and a BBB offers the best odds for the longshot. 17 These results are in line with
Hypothesis 2.
5.3. The Efficiency of Bookmakers Odds by Type
In exploring the broader context for the relative values of odds on favourites and longshots
between groups, Table 7 presents the results of estimating separate conditional logistic
regression models (as described in (14) and (18)) based on the 1X2 odds offered on soccer
matches across the six leading European leagues by PTBs and BBBs, respectively, for our extended
sample of 6,396 matches over the three seasons from 2010-11 to 2012-13. The forecasting
accuracy of odds offered by BBBs is higher on average compared to that of PTBs’ odds, as
represented by the higher average McFadden’s pseudo-R2. Whilst the increase in pseudo-R2
appears small, it is likely to be economically significant (e.g. Benter, 1994). This result is in line
with Hypothesis 3b and is consistent with the evidence provided by Franck et al. (2013) and Smith
et al. (2006, 2009) that demand-driven (as opposed to traditional PTB) markets are more efficient
predictors of event outcomes.
The values of the coefficients in the conditional logistic regressions, and the related significance
tests, indicate in general that the FLB is more pronounced for PTBs than for BBBs. The notable
exception is for the odds offered by the BBB, SBOBet, whose over-round for the 1X2 market is
the highest amongst BBBs. The conditional logistic regression based on Pinnacle’s odds (whose
over-round in the 1X2 market is as low as it is for AHs) has a coefficient very close to 1, suggesting
no FLB. This variation of the bias is in line with the Vaughan Williams’s (1999) proposition that
the level of transaction costs affects the degree of FLB. The extent of the bias is likely to indicate
that BBBs (excluding Pinnacle) aim to direct the demand for longshots to AH markets, in order to
facilitate the balancing of their books in that market.
17 In general, PTBs, do not offer higher odds for favourites on average than BBBs due to their higher over-round.
However, their odds on favourites are closer to those offered by BBBs than the odds they offer on longshots. This
finding suggests that they probably do not distribute their over-round proportionally.
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Table 7: This table reports the results of conditional logit modelling (using equations (14) and (18)) based on the odds
offered by six bookmakers in the extended sample for all match outcomes (Home win, Draw, Away win; 19,188 total
observations of odds per bookmaker). Bookmakers are classified as either position-takers or book-balancers. The
third and fourth columns of the table report the estimated coefficient of the conditional logit model and its standard
error, respectively. The fifth column reports the p-value of a Z-test to determine whether the true value of the
coefficient in column three is equal to 1. The sixth column reports the result of test whether the coefficient is
significantly greater than 1 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels with the signs (*), (**), and (***), respectively. The final
column reports the McFadden Pseudo-R2 of the conditional logit model.
Group Bookmaker Coefficient Std. Error
Prob.
(Coeff. = 1) Sig. Pseudo-R2
Position Takers
Ladbrokes 1.0743 0.0309 0.0081 (***) 0.1085
William Hill 1.0605 0.0304 0.0232 (**) 0.1101
Bet365 1.0560 0.0302 0.0318 (**) 0.1106
Book Balancers
SBOBet 1.0784 0.0311 0.0059 (***) 0.1106
188Bet 1.0413 0.0299 0.0831 (*) 0.1113
Pinnacle 1.0081 0.0289 0.3900 0.1114
5.4. “Winners” and “Losers” in Arbitrage Opportunities
In order to identify which group of bookmakers would tend to lose against potential arbitrageurs,
should the identified risk-free opportunities be exploitable, we employ the simulation described
in (10). Placing $1 on all 813 outcomes for which the odds posted by PTBs form part of the fully-
hedged portfolio, yields an average profit of $0.16 per bet. Adopting the same strategy, of backing
all outcomes where the BBBs’ odds feature in the optimal fully hedged portfolio, results in a loss
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of $0.024 per bet.18,19 The profit obtained on the bets placed at the PTBs odds in these cases is
significantly higher than the profit (i.e. in fact a loss) obtained on the bets placed at the BBBs odds
(t-statistic = 3.37, p-value = 0.000).
Adjusting the strategy, as described by (13), leads to an average profit per bet of $0.04 per $1
stake against PTBs and an average loss of −$0.047 per $1 stake against BBBs. These returns
remain significantly different (t-statistic = 2.60, p-value = 0.005). This result supports Hypothesis
3a, namely, that PTBs would suffer losses on average when an apparent arbitrage opportunity
exists.
Interestingly, the loss incurred against the BBBs on these bets is close to their over-round.20 Put
another way, that component of the arbitrage portfolio placed through BBBs generates returns
for a bettor equal to their expected loss had they placed a random bet with these bookmakers.
In other words, the fact that another bookmaker offers sufficiently different odds to generate an
apparent arbitrage opportunity does not change the expected value they receive from their bets.
Hence, this result effectively justifies Pinnacle’s statement that the motive for a bet (e.g. intention
to arbitrage) should be irrelevant to a BBB.21 From the bettor’s perspective, a higher return is
expected by placing bets against outlying odds of PTBs, rather than by hedging such positions
against BBBs, since in the latter case, the average profit drops to $0.013 per $1 bet. Consequently,
there is evidence from these simulations to support Hypothesis 3a, the expected loss from an
18 In this case, $1 is bet on each offer that falls part of the portfolio, no matter what the fraction of capital allocated
from the optimization (4). Therefore, the results of this simulation are not comparable to the results of the fully
hedged strategy. By way of example, the fully hedged strategy may assign 90% of the capital to bet A and 10% to bet
B and hence, we would bet $0.90 and $0.10 on these products, respectively. However, in the unit-stake simulation
$1 is staked on bet A and $1 on bet B, since the objective is to identify how the profit is distributed across the two
types of bookmakers, rather than to create a hedged position.
19 55 out of 813 $1 bets that were placed at gross odds greater than $5 had an extremely high profit of $1.30. As
a result, this small number of lucky bets account for $71.60 out of the $130 won in total by this strategy. Hence, it is
important to ensure that they do not bias the conclusions. This is achieved by applying the weighting implied by
equation (13).
20 The over-round of such bookmakers is about 2% for AH products and 5% − 6% for 1X2 products, excluding
Pinnacle, which employs an over-round of around 2% in the 1X2 market.
21 Pinnacle’s statement is: “[A]ll bookmakers shouldn’t care about the motivation for placing a bet, but should
simply look to balance the bet volume.” Source: http://www.pinnaclesports.com/ betting-promotions/arbitrage-
friendly.
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apparent arbitrage opportunity is likely to be suffered by the PTBs. This is consistent with Franck
et al.’s (2013) findings.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper explores the impact of the entry of book-balancing bookmakers (BBBs) on the
efficiency of the market for European soccer betting, which was previously dominated by position
taking bookmakers (PTBs). We identified arbitrage opportunities across bookmakers from a
unique data set of 1X2 and AH odds for soccer games played in major European leagues. Match
odds were collected close to kick-off, when markets are most liquid. Employing a linear
programming methodology, we identified the best combination for each of 545 games where a
fully hedged profitable investment appeared to be possible.
Such a strategy could, in theory, guarantee a profit of 1.3% per game on average. To a degree,
our findings confirm those of Franck et al. (2013); arbitrage opportunities mainly exist across,
rather than within, market structures. However, importantly, our data assembly assures that the
disparate odds required to form an arbitrage portfolio were concurrently available, and were
sufficiently liquid to be exploited. Whilst previous studies have treated bookmakers as a
homogeneous set, our study makes the explicit distinction between incumbent PTBs and new
entrant BBBs as a basis for investigating distinctions in odds menus and opportunities for
profitable arbitrage. The results suggest that the two groups of bookmakers are indeed distinct
in terms of odds setting and that the consequent arbitrage opportunities are principally
accounted for by PTBs’ inefficient pricing.
This pricing policy may be intentional, in order to attract customers, and/or the result of their
prices lagging behind BBBs (due to the pace at which BBBs’ odds are informatively updated,
driven by the flow of “smart money”).22 Given the public availability of BBB odds, it seems fair to
assume that if the sole objective of the price setting strategies of PTBs were the efficient
calibration of event outcomes they would fully align their odds with those of BBBs. The setting of
22 Pinnacle state “This limiting of arbitrage players is a reflection of a bookmaker’s short-comings, such as posting
‘bad odds,’ or an inability to move odds fast enough to avoid being the focus of arbitrage players.”
Source: https://www.pinnaclesports.com/betting-promotions/arbitrage-friendly.
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promotional odds may assist PTBs in identifying informed clients, who tend to place bets only at
prices with negative expectation for the bookmaker. In addition, and as reported above,
significant evidence exists that such bookmakers operate discriminating behaviour against long-
term winning customers. Consequently, we argue that the majority of apparent arbitrage
opportunities observed in soccer betting markets are very unlikely to be exploitable in practice.
In the context of the betting market considered here, the original concept of the EMH, where
market prices converge to fundamental values, subject to the activity of informed traders, may
be open to challenge as efficiency in this case, in terms of an absence of exploitable arbitrage
opportunities, is a function of PTBs’ restriction of trade, rather than odds convergence.
The experience from other financial markets, in which exchanges with lower commissions, such
as Chi-X, have gained traction in the marketplace alongside established competitors (He, Jarnecic,
and Liu, 2015), suggests that the traditional PTBs risk losing market share to the BBBs. Thus, we
would predict that as bettors become more sophisticated and recognize the availability of
exchanges with lower execution costs and higher liquidity, PTBs will mimic the BBB model,
focusing more on holding balanced books rather than setting profit-maximizing prices.
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